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Abstract:
The expected benefits of transparency in government, such as increased public engagement and
trust, are well established. Transparency also enables a better accounting of elected officials by the
public, but this accounting depends on having rules in place and someone responsible for enforcing
those rules. The Ontario government took steps to provide this for local governments in Ontario
when it permitted municipalities to create codes of conduct and to hire a municipal Integrity
Commissioner to enforce those codes. However, the ultimate accountability is delivered by the
voting public during municipal elections and, in order for this political accountability regime to be
effective, it is essential that the public be informed of the activities of Integrity Commissioners so
that they can make informed decisions at the ballot box.
This research project assesses the online presence of Integrity Commissioners in Ontario’s largest
municipalities to answer the question: How transparent are municipal Integrity Commissioners in
Ontario? By quantifying the transparency of their activities, the research seeks to establish the
extent to which Integrity Commissioners are likely to contribute to the expected benefits of
transparency. It is found that the transparency varies widely across municipalities, and as a result
the contribution that Integrity Commissioners can be expected to make in their communities
remains unclear. Recommendations are made for a standardization of the online communication
of Integrity Commissioners to ensure the best possible public use of the role.
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Introduction
Accountability of elected officials is an important element of modern democracy. In order
to be able to hold those representatives to account, however, the voting public needs to be aware
of their activities so that they can make informed decisions on election day. The benefits of an
informed public are not limited to accountability at the ballot box, however. A significant body of
research has focused on transparency in government and the various contributions that
transparency can make, such as increased public trust (Kassen, 2013) and confidence in
government (da Cruz et al., 2016). An informed populace is also expected to be more engaged and
be able to participate more actively in any accounting of government (Halachmi and Greiling,
2013; Kassen, 2013). In a world of increasingly electronic engagement (Stedman, 2018) demanded
by a public increasingly distrustful of opaque government processes (da Cruz et al., 2016)), the
effectiveness of the ways in which the public is informed can play a significant role in how
effective a government can be (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013).
However, the opportunity for the public to hold governments to account in elections only
comes around periodically. Is there any accountability in the interim? In Canada, arms-length
officers of legislature have been created in order to provide some accounting of the behaviour of
elected officials throughout their term. The Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario
both established versions of accountability officers to ensure that elected officials conduct their
business ethically (OCIEC, 2020) and to provide transparency and accountability in government
(OICO, 2021). The roles that they are intended to play in terms of objectively assessing behaviour
and publicizing the results of their efforts both align with contributions to accountability in
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government predicted by the literature, but a similar role did not exist for local governments in
Ontario until relatively recently.
Municipalities in Ontario are created and empowered by the Municipal Act, 2001, and in
2006 the Province of Ontario amended the Act to enable municipalities in Ontario to create their
own codes of conduct that establish standards of behaviour elected officials and to appoint an
Integrity Commissioner to enforce that code (Rust-d’Eye, 2011). Further amendments in 2018
mandated these things for all municipalities in Ontario (Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, s.
223.3). The role of Integrity Commissioners was created to provide an accountability mechanism
that not only enforces codes of conduct but also to provide a resource that educates elected officials
about their obligations under those codes, and their work is to be made available to the public
(Rust-d’Eye, 2011).
In theory, this disclosure of information regarding councillor behaviour by Integrity
Commissioners allows the public to hold locally elected officials accountable for their actions
while in office (Sancton, 2017), but the effectiveness of the communication, a key element of
transparency of government, also plays a significant role in the contribution it can be expected to
make (Cucciniello and Nasi, 2014). What becomes apparent, however, is that the way in which
Integrity Commissioner work in Ontario is reported and published varies significantly. For
example, accessing the City of Ottawa’s website requires only two well-labelled links from the
home page (“Open, Transparent and Accountable Government” and “Integrity Commissioner”) to
lead directly to a webpage containing Integrity Commissioner reports, contact information and
clear descriptions of the Integrity Commissioner’s mandate and how to access the office, as well
as basic information like the code of conduct. By contrast, a visit to the Town of Oakville’s website
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requires only slightly more obscure navigation but leads to a page that contains the only complaints
process and a link to the code of conduct, with no reports or any other accounting of the activities
of the Integrity Commissioner. Even the identity of the Integrity Commissioner is missing and is
only revealed on the complaints form. Considering the importance of municipal websites to the
transparency of local governments, this variability of online content then begs the question: if
Integrity Commissioners and their work are not consistently communicating effectively to the
public, is it possible to say that the role of Integrity Commissioner is contributing equally in all
municipalities to the public’s ability to participate in local government and hold their elected
officials to account?
This research paper will be an evaluation that seeks to quantify the communication element
of the contribution that Integrity Commissioners are currently making to local governments.
Specifically, it will answer the question: How transparent are municipal Integrity Commissioners
in Ontario? To that end, a review of the relevant literature will describe how transparency of
communication by Integrity Commissioners is expected to contribute to accountability in local
government. This research will then be applied to the online presence of select Integrity
Commissioners in order to establish how likely it is that the voting public is benefiting from the
expense of employing these agents of accountability.
An evaluation of the transparency of the role of municipal Integrity Commissioner is
important to the study of local government in Ontario because in many ways it speaks directly to
public trust (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013)). Developing a better understanding of how the
transparency of current practices could be improved will enable municipalities, through their
Integrity Commissioners, to contribute more to the political process in their communities. It is in
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consideration of the complexity of the issue of accountability in local government that this
evaluation of the efficacy of the Integrity Commissioner role in Ontario will be pursued. Rather
than attempting to evaluate how effective the role is at increasing the accountability of local
government, the research instead focuses on how it can be expected to contribute to that goal. It is
therefore considered a useful contribution to the literature to compare and contrast how various
municipalities have implemented the mandatory office of Integrity Commissioner, distinguishing
them based on how well they communicate their function and products to the public.
The paper is presented in four sections. The first section reviews relevant academic theories
related to transparency and accountability in government. The second section briefly describes the
history of accountability officers in Canada and Ontario in order to provide context for Ontario’s
municipal Integrity Commissioners. The third section develops an analytical framework for
operationalizing the online content of Integrity Commissioner webpages and presents an analysis
of the results. Finally, the fourth section provides recommendations for improvements to the
Integrity Commissioner role that could enhance the transparency of the office, thereby increasing
the likelihood that they can contribute to goals of accountability for elected representatives in local
government.

Section One: What does the literature say about transparency in local
government?
Conceived as an agent of accountability in local government (Hardeman, 2006), the
municipal Integrity Commissioner in Ontario was intended to ensure that citizens are well
represented by their elected officials. In practice, what does this actually mean, and how can
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sometimes overused terms like transparency and accountability apply to how municipal Integrity
Commissioners can contribute to effective governance in Ontario municipalities? This section
explores some theoretical concepts that can be useful in evaluating these contributions, starting
with the focus of this research: transparency.

Transparency
In order for the public to contribute effectively to government decision making, some form
of access to much of the same information that decision makers have is necessary (Kassen, 2013),
and an availability of government information to the public to enable discourse and assessment is
viewed as a way to enable the public to hold their government to account (Lyons and Spicer, 2018).
In their review of the adoption of open government features in American local governments,
Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch (2012) provide a concise definition of transparency “as the
disclosure of information by an organization that enables external actors to monitor and assess its
internal workings and performance” (p. 563), which seems an appropriate perspective from which
to view the contribution that transparent municipal Integrity Commissioners can make.
Trends in the United States towards open government under the Obama administration led
to a significant amount of research on the topic of e-government initiatives. The transparency
provided by a shift to open data regimes there has been celebrated as an opportunity for promoting
civic engagement and public trust in government (Kassen, 2013). Efficiency of government was
also cited as a potential benefit of open data and transparency (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013),
particularly as a result of the discourse that it could generate in a better-informed electorate
(Kassen, 2013). Further, since the results of any process are open to subjective interpretation and
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there is rarely a result that all observers would find equally satisfactory, it becomes apparent that
transparency is related more to process in government than it is necessarily to results (Ball, 2009).
However, simply disclosing information is not sufficient for generating the type of useful
engagement that the literature suggests is possible. The information that is shared must be useful
to the consumer in order to achieve transparency (Cucciniello and Nasi, 2014; Fox, 2007). Not
only that, leveraging the media forums that a majority of society favours (internet content, social
media) is also an essential component of effective transparency in the modern era (Stedman, 2018).
Considerations such as these form part of the distinction between mandatory disclosure and true,
purposeful transparency, which is an important distinction that must be considered when
evaluating the transparency of a role like the municipal Integrity Commissioner.
While society increasingly demands that governments be transparent, certain aspects of the
work of government do require some element of secrecy. Accordingly, the provincial and federal
governments in Canada are permitted to conduct vast amounts of their business behind closed
doors. However, this option is significantly curtailed in local governments in Ontario. The
Municipal Act, 2001 does allow municipal councils to go in camera to debate issues behind closed
doors in specific instances where the information discussed must be kept private. However, those
instances are very closely prescribed and the vast majority of the work that municipal councils
undertake must be conducted in forums that are open to the public (Municipal Act, 2001).1
Even agents of accountability and transparency are subject to the same limitations. Just as
some municipal business must remain behind closed doors, so too must some of the work of the

1
From this perspective it has been argued that local government is already the most transparent level of government
in Canada (AMCTO, 2017), although that does not lessen the benefits of enhancing that transparency.
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Integrity Commissioner. For example, transparency of process was at the heart of an Integrity
Commissioner investigation into the conduct of then-Deputy Mayor Michael DiBiase in the City
of Vaughan (MacEwan, 2018). DiBiase was, among other things, accused of contravening
Vaughan’s code of ethics by manipulating a procurement process and attempting to influence staff
in relation to a construction contract award. There were also allegations that DiBiase threatened
reprisals against those who testified against him (ibid.). In a case like this, the need to protect the
identity of the witnesses is obvious. DiBiase requested a judicial review of the investigation
process, contending, in part, that he was not afforded due process due to the secrecy of the
investigation undertaken by the Integrity Commissioner, but the court unanimously supported the
level of secrecy employed and rejected the appeal (ibid.).
Notwithstanding the need to protect certain information, the contribution that transparency
can make to an engaged public is clearly supported by the literature (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013),
and current models of public service are becoming increasingly oriented to public engagement and
empowerment (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2015). However, even though transparency is considered
an essential element of democracy that contributes to engagement, it does not necessarily
guarantee that those in power will behave appropriately. Transparency in government must
therefore inform other mechanisms in order to generate some level of accountability on the part of
elected officials.

Accountability
Accountability is a frequently used term, but what does it actually mean in a local
government context, and how is it linked to transparency? Generally speaking, in electing
representatives to make decisions on their behalf, citizens are ceding a certain level of control over
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their individual lives in the interest of security and stability. This relationship is described as one
of agency: Elected officials and the electorate participate in a “principal-agent” arrangement
whereby the elected officials exercise powers delegated to them by the voting public (Lyons and
Spicer, 2018).
Any delegation of power and control also comes with opportunities for abuse, and past
instances of that abuse led to the creation of early ethics commissions at the turn of the 20th century,
with reforms continuing through the 1960s and 1970s (Smith, 2003). Often, these types of reforms
are implemented in response to specific scandals involving abuses of power in government (ibid.).
As evidenced by the recent creation of municipal Integrity Commissioners in Ontario, reforms
continue to this day. Considering the prevalence throughout history of abuses of power by
governments of various forms and stripes, it is reasonable for the principal in governmental
relationships (the voting public) to want some means of holding their agents to account for their
actions while in positions of delegated power.
In their exploration of a link between transparency and accountability, Halachmi and
Greiling (2013) describe that an accountability of the agent to the principal depends on certain
things: “First, the party requesting the accounting can affect when and how the account is provided.
Second, there are real, as different from symbolic, consequences for any failure to comply with
the said request. Third, the content or substance of the account can be used by the requesting party
as a justification for action that would influence the future status or performance of the party that
is asked to give the account” (p. 566). The role of transparency in government in this accountability
model is clear. While the first two conditions are related to the political consequences of an
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accounting of behaviour, the third condition clearly carries no weight if the information available
to the public is obscure or incomplete.
At the same time, focusing accountability efforts on “credit and blame” narratives has the
potential to obscure the benefits that transparent disclosure and discussion can provide for true
accountability to an informed public (Anderson, 2009). Accountability regimes also carry with
them the risk that overly restrictive practices will remove the ability of individuals to apply
discretion to specific situations or stifle innovation (ibid.) and auditing a government in real-time
has the potential to heighten this environment. Not only that, such audits have been characterized
as “transfers of institutional power to audit bodies who decide on a wide range of issues and who,
by definition, overstep their purely auditing jurisdiction to become de facto policy makers” (Power,
2007; p. 9). Research into Canadian federal parliamentary officers has identified similar concerns
about over-reach of accountability mandates (Bergman and MacFarlane, 2018).
Notwithstanding the risks associated with an over-zealous pursuit of accountability, an audit
function clearly provides an opportunity for informed public discourse if the investigations are
conducted with transparency and the results are made publicly available. Transparency in this
instance enhances the accountability mandate and also mitigates concerns about over-reach of the
audit function by putting more of the power for accountability into the hands of the public.
Municipal Integrity Commissioners are clearly well positioned to leverage this audit role into
enhanced accountability through active and purposive transparency.

Transparency and Political Accountability
As described, accountability in principal-agent relationships is important. Further to
Halachmi and Greiling’s (2013) definition, which requires that the principal has some means of
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influencing the “future status or performance” of the agent (p.566), a discussion of principal-agent
accountability by Lyons and Spicer (2018) described it generally as consisting of three phases:
“information, discussion and consequences” (p. 182), which more closely resembles the
accountability mechanism embodied by the electoral process. Information is provided to the
electorate in the form of a candidate’s past performance and priorities for the next electoral term
(the platform). This information is then discussed by the candidates and the voting public in various
forums (the campaign). The process culminates on election night when the results of the election
deliver consequences to the candidates, either positive or negative. However, it becomes clear that
without a reliable and accessible source of information, the accounting on election night can be
expected to be incomplete. It is here that transparency of local government can be seen to
contribute directly to political accountability, assuming that the public acts on the information they
receive (Ball, 2009).
For local governments in Ontario, the opportunity to hold elected officials accountable for
their actions in this way comes every four years (Municipal Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c.32,
s. 4 (1)). The obvious question that results from an accountability regime that relies on political
accountability (electoral results) alone for its enforcement is whether or not an accounting every
four years is sufficient considering the importance of this particular principal-agent relationship.2
It is also worthwhile to consider how prevalent misconduct actually is. Valerie Jepson (2018), the
former Integrity Commissioner for the City of Toronto, observed while in that role that elected
officials typically tried to avoid contravening the code of conduct, and further that she approached

2
The municipal Integrity Commissioner does play a non-executive role in the punitive aspects of this accountability
regime. However, that is not material to an evaluation of transparency and so will not be discussed further.
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her work from the perspective “that elected officials who volunteer to run for public office are
people of good will and intention” (p. 47).
Considering the relative infrequency of councillor transgressions and also of opportunities
for accountability, perhaps it is more important to ensure that the electoral accounting, when it
does occur, is being delivered by a sufficiently informed and sufficiently large portion of the
population, rather than focusing on the need for immediate repercussions for improper behaviour.
The availability of a resource like the municipal Integrity Commissioner to review and report on
activities during the term allows for scrutiny within electoral cycles. Ensuring that those reports
are available when the election begins provides the necessary information to voters when they
need it. By providing transparent public access to files such as these during a term the government
not only becomes presumably more transparent but also more efficient as it could promote civic
engagement by enabling citizens to participate in various discussions on how to better address their
needs (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013; Kassen, 2013).
Despite the multiplicity of research extolling the virtues of transparency, it is certainly not a
foregone conclusion that enhanced transparency in government will lead to better-informed voters
and increased civic engagement. Some have gone so far as to debate the basic assumption that
there is any substantial link between transparency and accountability at all (Fox, 2007). Analysis
of Integrity Commissioner work in Ontario seemed to support this view when it identified no
significant correlation between the occurrence of complaints against councillors and election
results in local government elections (Arbuckle, 2018). Even the benefits of transparency of
government itself are debated, with pessimists claiming that transparency can lead to, among other
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things, an increase in unjustified blaming activity by the public and unnecessary challenges to
government activity (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013).
However, as Gingras notes: “although the public sphere is neither rational nor transparent, it
nevertheless is a place for debates about public issues. Information is considered vital to
democracy” (2012: p. 223). Further, Sancton, (2017), Jepson (2018) and others have identified a
contribution to political accountability as an essential role that Integrity Commissioners can play
in local government in Ontario. Finally, a substantial body of literature shows a relationship
between transparency, accountability and public trust in local government, and even further that
technologically focused means of communication and disclosure can play a significant role in that
relationship (da Cruz et al., 2016). An engaged electorate, debating readily available information
on the business of government, is therefore considered an essential part of political accountability
and true representational government.
The behaviour of municipal councils can have an immense impact on the business of local
governments and, while election night provides the ultimate opportunity to hold elected officials
accountable for their actions while in office, that mechanism clearly has limitations. For example,
the landslide re-election mayor Mike Bradley in Sarnia in 2018 despite multiple well-publicized
allegations of workplace harassment is theorized to have led to a mass exodus of senior
administrators in that City (Kula, 2018; 2019). Notwithstanding the debate surrounding the role
that transparency plays in engaging the public, and whether or not it actually leads to enhanced
accountability, if an accountability officer is to hold an already transparent government to account
it would seem appropriate that that officer should aspire to at least the same ideals of transparency.
As da Cruz et al. (2016) observe: “Without transparency, integrity and good performance are not
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demonstrable and accountability mechanisms are not enforceable” (p. 884). The literature
demonstrates that by enhancing the transparency of accountability officers, their ability to
contribute to the accountability of local governments should also be enhanced, and therefore an
assessment of how transparent Integrity Commissioners in Ontario are contributes to the study of
that role in local government.

Section Two: How are governments accountable to residents of Ontario?
The preceding analysis demonstrates that ensuring accountability in government through
transparency is a complex task, especially in a local government context. Before we consider the
relatively recent development of the Integrity Commissioner model in Ontario, it is useful to
consider how accountability in government is pursued at the senior levels of government in order
to understand the environment in which the Integrity Commissioner was conceived.

Predecessors of Municipal Integrity Commissioners in the Federal and Provincial
Governments
The Governments of Canada and Ontario both have established offices for accountability of
elected officials. The Government of Canada has established the Office of the Conflict of Interest
and Ethics Commissioner (OCIEC) as “an independent Officer of Parliament who is responsible
for administering the Conflict of Interest Act for public office holders and the Conflict of Interest
Code for Members of the House of Commons” (OCIEC, 2020). There has been a progression of
roles and mechanisms for accountability of elected officials in the federal government starting in
1973, with the current incarnation being created in 2004 (OCIEC, 2021). The Ethics Commissioner
created in 2004 was especially notable because it was the first version of the office that reported
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to the House of Commons rather than to the Prime Minister. Similar to the federal government,
the Ontario provincial government established the Office of the Integrity Commissioner (OICO)
“as an independent ethics leader, working to encourage and support high ethical standards that
strengthen trust and confidence in the Ontario government. As an Officer of the Legislative
Assembly, the Integrity Commissioner is independent of government.” (OICO, 2021).
Pertinent to a discussion about Integrity Commissioners in Ontario, a significant change to
the federal accountability regime occurred in 1985 when the Government of Canada adopted a
code of conduct3 rather than simply pursuing a rules-based approach (Kernaghan, 2007). One key
difference between a code of conduct and a rules-based system is that a code of conduct sets out
general standards of behaviour and values that are expected (Kernaghan, 1997) without the need
for all transgressions to be individually defined. If councillor behaviour was governed by a rulesbased system, any conflicts of interest or misbehaviour would need to be specifically identified
and demonstrated to be contrary to that rule. In a code of conduct system, shades of grey are
introduced which then open the door for important concepts in governmental accountability such
as apparent conflicts of interest (Jepson, 2018). This seems to be the more appropriate model given
that the accountability of elected officials is largely constructed on subjective values like ethics
and service of the public interest (Kernaghan, 1997).
That is not to say that these codified values cannot be defined; in fact they have been referred
to as a “bedrock of organizational culture” (Kernaghan, 1997: p. 44). Rather, because there is some

3

Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders was created in 1985 in response to
frequent conflict of interest allegations in government, even though the government of the day did not accept the
findings of a report investigating them (Kernaghan, 2007).

15

subjectivity to these elements, frequent modifications of the code can be avoided despite
successive councils with differing world views. Kernaghan notes that “the single greatest
advantage of a code of ethics is the measure of certainty it provides for standards of ethical conduct
expected from public servants” (1980: p. 218). If codes of conduct were to be modified frequently,
their power is therefore diminished. If leaders break those codes, their ability to lead is also
weakened (Ford and Ford, 2010). Ironically, then, the ability of codes of conduct in government
to reliably guide the behaviour of those elected officials subject to it relies in no small part on the
honesty and integrity of those same leaders. It turns out that this irony is directly applied in the
accountability regime introduced for municipalities in Ontario.

Accountability in Local Government in Ontario
In Canada, municipalities are “creatures of the province”, which means that local
governments derive their power solely from their provincial government, and only to the extent
that the province decides (Sancton, 2015). In Ontario, many of these powers are now provided
generally with only process being prescribed (Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c.25), which
enhances municipal autonomy (Sancton, 2015). However, this newly found autonomy still is not
absolute, and the Province of Ontario has periodically demonstrated a willingness to unilaterally
exercise its absolute control over municipalities.4
Because municipalities only exist under enabling legislation from the Province, imposing
standards of behaviour upon municipal councillors can still be seen as a function generally falling

4

As a recent example, the City of London had successfully implemented ranked balloting for the 2016 municipal
election, and other municipalities had voted to follow suit. The Province used an omnibus COVID-19 measures bill
to remove a municipality’s ability to select an alternative election model despite little expressed support from
academics and practitioners (LeBel, 2020).
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under the jurisdiction of the Province. What then prompted the provincial government to consider
some sort of locally empowered accountability officer for Ontario municipalities? In 2001, a
scandal surfaced in the City of Toronto, revealing substantial abuses of power and conflicts of
interest related to the procurement of leased computers and tax collection software in the preceding
decade (Fernando, 2007). The scale of the abuses and the length of time over which they were
perpetrated warranted a judicial inquiry. The inquiry was presided over by Justice Denise E.
Bellamy beginning in late 2002 and culminated in the release of the Bellamy Report in 2005 (ibid.).
The Bellamy Report contained many recommendations for measures that should be taken by the
City of Toronto specifically, and other Ontario municipalities generally, in order to avoid similar
scandals in the future. The resultant amendments to the Municipal Act, 2001 in 2006 (through Bill
130, the Municipal Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006) implemented some of the
recommendations, including the authority of municipal council to establish codes of conduct for
councillors and board members and the authority to hire an independent Integrity Commissioner
(Rust-d’Eye, 2011). At the time, the appointment of an Integrity Commissioner was only mandated
for the City of Toronto, but further amendments to the Municipal Act, 2001 (through Bill 68, the
Modernizing Ontario’s Municipal Legislation Act, 2017) have now required it of all Ontario
municipalities (Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, s. 223.3). Generally speaking, Integrity
Commissioners are expected to provide an independent source of advice and review regarding the
actions of municipal councillors and board members (Rust-d’Eye, 2011). Integrity Commissioners
can only make findings and recommendations for sanction against council members who are found
to contravene the code of conduct, and it is council that then decides whether or not to impose

17

those sanctions or others (Municipal Act, 2001, S.O 2001, s. 223.4 (5)). This is the irony of the
system alluded to earlier, whereby municipal councillors are in effect expected to police each other.
What makes the 2006 amendments to the Municipal Act, 2001 in 2006 significant is that
they allowed for the creation of codes of conduct for municipal councillors by the municipalities
themselves (Alcantara et al., 2012). Enabling the creation of a code of conduct by municipalities
is effectively a delegation of a portion of the Province’s jurisdiction over Ontario’s municipalities.
As previously described, codes of conduct are often vague and deal with constructs of behaviour
that are better described as values rather than rules (Kernaghan, 1997), and also allow for broader
interpretations for accountability in local government (Jepson, 2018). Leaving the development of
the code of conduct up to local governments allows them to set expectations and norms that suit
their community and mandate, which is one of the reasons that codes of conduct are seen as more
agile and better suited to the current political environment in Ontario (AMCTO, 2017).
Interestingly, this autonomy to develop a code of conduct was then subsequently mandated for all
municipalities through amendments enacted in 2018 (Bill 68, the Modernizing Ontario’s
Municipal Legislation Act, 2017), suggesting that only a limited number of municipalities actually
chose to take on this accountability role for themselves.
It is perhaps misleading to identify the Bellamy Report as the justification for the municipal
Integrity Commissioner role in Ontario as Fernando (2007), Sancton (2017), Jepson (2018) and
others have done. Notwithstanding that the need for an Integrity Commissioner was laid out in the
Bellamy Report, the findings heavily implicated members of the administration. Since Integrity
Commissioners can only investigate the actions of elected officials and recommend sanctions, the
decision still rests with council whether or not to punish a colleague. Therefore, the role of this
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independent watchdog in local government falls well short of being considered a solution to the
problems unearthed by Justice Bellamy. It might be more appropriate to identify it as the beginning
of discussions at the provincial level around accountability mechanisms in local government and
how those goals might be achieved. Nevertheless, an impartial third party that can investigate and
offer public recommendations to council specifically related to questionable conduct shortly after
it occurred can only be seen as contributing the accountability of elected officials in local
government, even if it does not necessarily result in electoral repercussions.
It becomes apparent that a review of the ways in which Integrity Commissioners can
contribute to the accountability of local governments is a useful exploration rather than focusing
on the delivery of accountability itself. The literature suggests that transparency in government is
increasingly demanded and expected by the public (Stedman, 2018), and that it can contribute to
accountability (Ball, 2009) even if the level of contribution is not necessarily clear (Fox, 2007).
Further, municipal websites have also been shown to be a key component of the transparency of
local government and engagement of the public (da Cruz et al., 2016). Accordingly, the remainder
of this research paper will be focused on establishing a means of measuring and comparing the
transparency of selected Integrity Commissioner webpages, which can perhaps serve as a gateway
to further research into the contributions that Integrity Commissioners make to local government
accountability more broadly.
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Section 3 - How transparent are municipal Integrity Commissioners in
Ontario?
If one were to evaluate the role that the Integrity Commissioner plays in local government
in Ontario, a logical first step would be an analysis of the types of complaints received and any
reports and sanctions that resulted. Indeed, the original intent of this research was to do just that.
However, to truly evaluate the effectiveness of an accountability regime, it would be necessary to
pursue an in-depth review of the activity of Integrity Commissioners, the content of their reports,
the resulting sanctions, the frequency of repeat offenders, and the impacts of sanctions on election
results to build on previous research such as that completed by Arbuckle (2018). In reality, such a
study would also be somewhat incomplete without interviews to establish the environment in
which the investigations were conducted, and the underlying reasons for the Integrity
Commissioners’ recommendations and subsequent council decisions. Nevertheless, if robust data
collection for the entire population were possible, statistical analysis could prove enlightening.
Unfortunately, this data collection proved to be a monumental effort delivering very little in the
way of useful information for many reasons:


The number of municipalities in Ontario (444) coupled with the absence of a centralized
repository of Integrity Commissioner reports makes data collection very labour
intensive;



Many municipalities do not post Integrity Commissioner annual reports online,
requiring the submission of requests through the municipality’s Clerk;
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Many municipal accountability policies and bylaws only require those investigations
that are reported to Council to be made public, and since many annual reports were also
not published it is impossible to discern whether there were no investigations or if the
reports simply needed to be requested;



There is a significant diversity of the quality and form of reporting across all
municipalities.

The inconsistency of reporting across municipalities would make any sort of allencompassing data collection and analysis very difficult. Case studies could be informative, but
the variability noted would make any generalizations as to the overall effectiveness of the
municipal Integrity Commissioner difficult to support. Indeed, how can one compare the effects
of a provincially mandated function across municipalities when the basic elements of the
implementation of that function are so inconsistent? What results then is an impression that the
transparency and public information goals of the Integrity Commissioner are not being universally
met, and that perhaps an evaluation of the communication of Integrity Commissioner materials is
a more meaningful (and measurable) initial contribution to make to the body of research in this
area.
As a result, this research project focuses on comparing how the activities and findings of
Integrity Commissioners are being communicated across Ontario municipalities, specifically
online, through the lens of transparency in local government and focused on the dissemination of
information through municipal websites. The main premise of this line of evaluation is that, in
order for the role of Integrity Commissioner to contribute in any meaningful way to accountability
for elected officials, it is considered essential that their work is being conveyed to the public in a
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transparent way so that it can help inform election-day decisions. This approach, assessing
transparency through a review of website content, mirrors the approach that da Cruz et al. took
when assessing the transparency of Portuguese local government webpages (2016). In that
research, the research team developed a means of calculating a ‘Municipal Transparency Index’
for each municipality based on observations from a given municipality’s website (ibid.: pp. 876878).
While da Cruz et al. (2016) used focus groups to establish evaluation criteria and weightings,
due to limitations of time and budget no focus groups were convened for this research project.
Instead, the literature review and a review of the legislated role of Integrity Commissioners was
used to establish a list of priorities for effective communication to the public. Very generally, those
priorities are that the public: understands the basic elements of the role of a municipal Integrity
Commissioner; knows how to make use of that office; and, most critically, has easy access to the
Integrity Commissioner’s work so that they can see the results of the role and assess its
contribution. By comparing how Integrity Commissioner information from the largest upper and
lower tier municipalities in Ontario is made available to the public through their websites, and
whether or not that information is useful in the ways described, we take one further step toward
assessing if municipal Integrity Commissioners can be perceived as meeting the goals of
transparency and accountability that the Province, and many of those same municipalities’
websites, claim to pursue.

Research Design
Assessing transparency is not a binary task. One cannot simply review a website and then
draw conclusions about whether or not that local government is transparent. There is a multitude
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of reasons for a website to be lacking in certain regards, and the ability to draw broad conclusions
about governmental intent is therefore significantly hindered. Municipalities vary significantly in
terms of size, financial and administrative capacity, community needs and even the communication
preferences of the electorate. As Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch observe: “Because transparency is
a potentially costly or complex dimension of e-government, its development and implementation
may depend on the capacity of the government in which it is situated” (2012: p. 564).
In consideration of these compounding limitations, the research design required a refinement
of the sample population. A basic assumption that had to be made was that larger populations bring
with them additional financial and/or administrative capacity and are more likely to rely on
electronic or virtual means for communication and civic engagement. Accordingly, thresholds for
selecting a sample population from the 444 Ontario municipalities were set as follows: lower and
single tier municipalities with populations greater than 150,000 (of which there are fifteen); and
upper tier municipalities with populations greater than 300,000 (of which there are seven).5 These
thresholds were arbitrarily selected, with the primary goal being to control for impacts related to
financial means. In order to be able to draw conclusions based on the results of this research, these
larger centres were assumed to have access to sufficient operating budgets and/or the technical
wherewithal to allow for effective communication via their own websites. A review of the
published operating budgets for the smallest upper and lower tier municipalities on the list (Simcoe
County and the City of Oshawa respectively) supports this assumption.6 More specific to this

5
6

Populations based on 2016 Canada Census data.

The 2019 Financial Information Reports identified the general government operating budgets for both Simcoe
County and the City of Oshawa as $37M. Those budgets exclude any service or program delivery, and the cost of
website maintenance is expected to form only a small fraction of those budgets.

23

research, it is further assumed that municipalities of this size are unlikely to experience any
significant barrier to making information easily available over the internet, which is supported by
the academic literature reviewed (Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch, 2012; da Cruz et al., 2016,
Stedman, 2018). If this is the case, then any identified deficiencies with regard to transparency
can be assumed to be as a result of either the performance of their appointed Integrity
Commissioner or the municipality’s approach to, procurement of, and terms of employment for
the role. Given that these would both be rational decisions made by a person or body in a position
of public trust, an assessment of the transparency of their actions is appropriate.
This case selection method does not differentiate between the two primary means of
providing Integrity Commissioner services (in-house or third party), since ultimately it is the
municipality’s responsibility to manage its own accountability regime and ensure compliance with
the requirements of the Municipal Act, 2001. The twenty-two municipalities reviewed displayed a
variety of Integrity Commissioner models, with one-third of the single or lower tier municipalities
employing an in-house Integrity Commissioner while the remaining two-thirds employed third
parties to provide this service.
Table 1 - Integrity Commissioner Model Distribution

Lower/Single Tier
(pop. > 150,000)
Upper Tier
(pop. > 300,000)

Number
15

In-House
5

Third-Party
10

7

0

7

On the surface there should be no compelling reason why either model would be any better
than the other at delivering transparency. Nevertheless, the quality of information related to the
Integrity Commissioner that each municipality makes available on its website varies significantly
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between and within both regimes, and the ease with which the public can obtain that information
is shown to be equally inconsistent. Since similar transparency across municipalities is not a given,
and yet is generally agreed to be an essential contributor to the political process, what is needed is
an objective way to compare them (da Cruz et al., 2016).

Scoring Transparency
While the concept of transparency in government is easy to understand generally, there are
multiple aspects of the perception of transparency that make developing a quantitative way to
measure it much more complex (da Cruz et al., 2016). In order to operationalize a subjective
characteristic like transparency in such a way as to permit a comparative analysis, a defined scoring
system is required.
Even though some have identified an absence of analytical frameworks for evaluating
transparency and accountability (Lourenco, 2015), there have been several models developed in
order to score the transparency of government, either generally through an open data lens
(Veljkovic et al., 2014), or specific to online content available on government websites
(Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch, 2012; da Cruz et al., 2016). In essence, local government webpages
like those for Integrity Commissioners in Ontario can be seen as a unique subset of the open data
movement in government. The goals identified in both cases are similar, and mirror the benefits
of transparency identified in the literature review. The availability of information online
contributes to an informed, engaged and more trusting citizenry (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013;
Veljkovic et al., 2014; da Cruz et al., 2016).
However, it is also clear that not all information is equally important, and that the act of
disclosing information does not necessarily equate to full transparency (Fox, 2007). How the data
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is presented also matters (Veljkovic et al., 2014), as does the quality (Fox, 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen
and Welch, 2012; da Cruz et al., 2016). Therefore, the various areas of interest relating to online
Integrity Commissioner content should not necessarily be weighted equally when assessing the
transparency of that local government office, and a need for some consideration for individual
weighting becomes apparent. The general categories for transparency that were established
consider to what extent a municipality’s webpage allows the reader to: understand the role of
Integrity Commissioner; know how to make use of the Integrity Commissioner; and have easy
access to the Integrity Commissioner’s work. The models for transparency previously discussed
can be applied to each in order to establish an appropriate system of weightings.
Scoring systems developed by researchers are invariably customized to the goals of their
research, so there is often limited direct transferability to be exploited in order to develop specific
lists of evaluation criteria and appropriate weighting. However, scoring systems developed for
open data in general perhaps hold potential for guiding this research project. The scoring system
designed by Veljkovic et al. (2014) for assessing open government through the lens of open data
assigned the following relative weights to various categories of open data environment
characteristics:


The presence of a basic data set = 15%;



Data openness (the quality of the data) = 33%;



Transparency (the utility and reliability of the data) = 26%;



Participation = 13%; and



Collaboration = 13% (Veljkovic et al., 2014: p. 285).
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Even though the latter two indices are important to the role of Integrity Commissioner overall,
they are somewhat immaterial to the goal of this research and can be discounted. However, the
first three measures appear to be appropriate given the preceding research findings, and so will be
retained as a starting point for the analysis, retaining the relative weightings assigned.
Similar to Veljkovic et al., da Cruz et al. (2016) avoided providing an equal weighting to the
criteria they developed for their Municipal Transparency Index. Working with an expert focus
group, they developed a list of transparency categories, each with a distinct number of ‘indicators’
(ibid.). Each indicator was then scored individually based on clear criteria that established what
content would obtain a given score (ibid.). As expected, the scoring system developed was too
specific to overall transparency of local government to be directly applicable to this research.
However, one important consideration that was included in this model was the concept that, in
attempting to establish objective scoring systems for subjective qualities, there should be some
consideration for the relative importance of the individual criterion to the overall score (the concept
of “trade-off”), rather than scoring based solely on the absolute qualities of an individual criterion
in isolation (ibid.: p. 881). In addition, a noted limitation of their work was the exclusion of
visibility or ease of access as evaluation criteria (ibid.). In the context of attempting to inform a
disinterested public about local government in Ontario, this is considered a significant omission
that will be avoided in this analysis design.
Accordingly, a fourth category will be added to the analysis: accessibility. Cucciniello and
Nasi (2014) spoke to the need for online content to be tailored to what the public needs and wants
rather than just what is required as a condition of effective transparency. This statement applies
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equally to content7 and presentation, such that increasing the ease with which the public can obtain
information increases the likelihood that it will be accessed and used (Stedman, 2018). Spoken
more plainly, providing information that the public wants and will access requires that online
Integrity Commissioner content and access points are designed from the public’s perspective and
not from a strict legal de minimis perspective. Since access to reliable information is taken as an
essential component of transparency, it should be weighted somewhat more heavily than simply
providing basic information.
By combining these diverse strategies for analyzing the transparency of documentation in a
governmental website, it is possible to develop a relatively robust and defensible strategy for
scoring the online presentation of an Integrity Commissioner’s work. Very generally, these
categories also reflect some of the key aspects of Lourenco’s framework for centralized
repositories of open government data (2015). Combining the strategies of Veljkovic et al. (2014),
da Cruz et al. (2016) and Cucciniello and Nasi (2014) allows for the broader categories of analysis
to be developed and weighted. The categorical weightings are based primarily upon those used by
Veljkovic et al., (2014), except that the category of accessibility has been added to better suit the
research presented thus far. By retaining the relative weighting of Veljkovic et al., but taking an
even 20% from each in order to provide weight to the added category of accessibility,8 we arrive
at the following categories:

7

Tailoring content by writing in plain language is also important in this context but will not be scored specifically. It
will be discussed further in the recommendations section of this report.
8
This is an admittedly arbitrary approach, but the resultant weightings do appear to be appropriate given the goals of
the research and the strategies of the referenced researchers.
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1. Accessibility (20%) – An essential component of transparency, but relatively easy to
provide. Therefore, full marks for accessibility alone should not translate into a high
score for transparency;
2. Basic Information (16%) – Again, easily provided information that is important to
the public’s access, but providing it should not be an end goal of transparency;
3. Data Utility (28%) – Predictable and well-presented content has been identified as
essential for full transparency;
4. Data Quality (36%) – Without comprehensive reporting to communicate the
information that is important and useful to the public, all the preceding criteria
become somewhat moot.
In order to minimize bias on the part of the author in scoring the transparency criteria upon
which the websites are to be evaluated, a very specific scoring rubric was developed. The strategies
of da Cruz et al. (2016) considering the concept of internal trade-off are used to establish the
relative scoring internal to each category and employing multiple metrics for enhanced
differentiation. Each category was allotted 10 points in total to be divided between the various
criteria, with the total points being multiplied by the category weighting in order to establish a
category score. The sum of all categories gives the transparency score out of 10.
𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡

i

𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒

i

𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒

The following description lists the criteria developed to specifically assess Integrity
Commissioner webpages, broken out by general conceptual areas and with the associated
weighting.
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1. Accessibility (20%)


Does the municipality have an Integrity Commissioner webpage that could be found?
(5 pts) – It is considered of high importance that the municipality hosts a dedicated
webpage with content related to the Integrity Commissioner. This is a binary criterion
where the existence of an Integrity Commissioner webpage garners full points;



Ability to navigate to Integrity Commissioner webpage (5 points) – This is a binary
criterion: full points are awarded if 3 or fewer selections are required to reach the
Integrity Commissioner webpage, or a specific accountability type webpage from which
the respective content is obviously available;



If navigation is not possible or is very obscure, subtract 1 point if a search for the
following terms, attempted in order, do not result in a link to the appropriate webpage:
o “Integrity Commissioner”;
o “Accountability”;
o “Complaint”;
o “Code of Conduct”.

2. Basic Information (16%)


Who is the Integrity Commissioner? (4 points) – This may seem an obvious piece of
information to include, but a review of municipal websites illustrates that it is commonly
excluded. Identification of the Integrity Commissioner on a dedicated webpage gets 4
points; 2 or more clicks beyond that page to find this information receives 2 points.
Providing contact information on forms receives 1 point. Very obscure or no reference
gets zero points;
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Description of the role, mandate and limitations (4 points) - Again, useful for educating
the public and clarifying the extent to which the Integrity Commissioner can pursue
various issues. It is also simple boiler plate information that would take very little effort
to include on a webpage. Incomplete descriptions receive only 1 point;



Link to Council Code of Conduct (2 points) – since the Code of Conduct is essential to
establishing the expected behavioural norms, the absence of easy access to the Code on
the webpage is considered important. Providing the code in a clear location gets 2 points,
while including it as part of another document received only 1 point.

3. Data Utility (28%)


Description of the complaints process (2 points) – If the process is not clearly defined,
how could the general public possibly hope to navigate a fairly technical legal process?
A clearly presented complaints process receives 2 points, while a poorly presented
process receives 1 point. No process description at all receives zero points;



Annual Reports (4 points) – While not mandated by the Municipal Act, 2001, an annual
report is considered an essential component of transparency to the public, both for
Council conduct and financial reasons. For this reason it should be considered
significant if annual reports are not available on the municipality’s webpage. Increasing
difficulty in obtaining reports is considered an obstacle to transparency. If annual reports
are available through the website’s search function or if some reports are missing only
2 points are awarded. If it is clearly indicated that they are only available by submitting
a request to the Clerk, 1 point is awarded;
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Investigation Reports (4 points) – This is also considered an essential component of the
Integrity Commissioner’s role. If all reports to Council are available on the Integrity
Commissioner webpage or with a single (clearly identified) link, full points are awarded.
If the annual report or the webpage clearly indicates that there were no investigations
that required a report, full points are also awarded. If investigation reports can only be
found through the website’s search function only 2 points are awarded. If it is clearly
indicated that they are only available by request to the Clerk, 1 point is awarded. If it is
not possible to establish if there were any reports, no points are awarded;

4. Data Quality (36%)


Clarity of basic information (2 points) – Presenting the information is important, but as
discussed, the format should suit the audience and purpose. This is a subjective criterion,
but it is included to help differentiate the various websites based on the perception of
quality of the webpage likely to be experienced by the public. Ease of use and clarity of
information are each allocated a single point. The subjective nature of this criterion is
not considered problematic due to the relatively small impact to overall scoring;



Annual report quality (8 points available). Only the quality of the current (2020) annual
report is considered. At the time of writing, over 6 months had elapsed since the end of
2020, which should be enough time to publish an annual report. Any longer risks
diminishing the relevance of the information presented. If no 2020 report was available,
a score of 0 points was awarded:
o List of Activities (4 pts total) – This metric is given the highest importance because
of its essential role in transparent reporting and informing the public. If this basic
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information is not included, the annual report serves very little purpose. Points are
awarded if the annual report describes (to the level of detail permissible) what types
of activities were undertaken (2 pts), and quantifies those activities (even if the
amount is zero) (2 pts);
o List of previous years’ activities (1 pt) – Providing the level of activity in previous
years not only allows for analysis of trends in budget expenditure and ethical conduct
but it also shows readers other years that may be worth reviewing. Not essential if all
annual reports are readily available (which allows for a single point even if the 2020
report is missing);
o Budget (2 pts) – Full disclosure of the cost of providing these services allows for
informed decision making on the part of Council and the public, but is not as essential
for councillor accountability;
o Description of role/mandate (1 pt) – Again, useful for educating the public and
clarifying the extent to which the Integrity Commissioner can pursue various issues,
but not essential for accountability. It is also simple boiler-plate information that
would take very little effort to include in annual reports.


The quality of Investigation Reports was not scored due to potential inconsistencies with
respect to the ability to divulge information due to privacy concerns. It is assumed for
this analysis that, if an Investigation Report is available, it divulges information to the
extent permitted.

Each municipality’s webpage was then visited and scored based on this system. In each case,
an attempt was made to locate information about the Integrity Commissioner through purposeful
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webpage navigation. If that was ineffective, the webpage search function was employed using the
keywords identified. While this approach is subjective since it depends on the abilities of the
searcher, it is assumed that this is actually a forgiving approach in this analysis since the author is
searching with a clear knowledge of the role, appropriate keywords, etc… Members of the general
public may not necessarily possess this knowledge, so locating this information would be even
more difficult for them.
It should be noted that the Annual Report and its contents are reflected in two separate
categories: Data Utility and Data Quality. This places significant weight on the provision of
Annual Reports, which appears appropriate given that the scoring system is meant to quantify how
effectively the Integrity Commissioner webpages are at communicating the work of the office. In
Data Utility, the presence of an Annual Report obtains 4 points on a weighting of 28%, or 1.12
points overall. The Data Quality scoring for Annual Report content totals an available 8 points on
a weighting of 36%, or 2.88 points overall. This means that the maximum score available to a
municipality without published Annual Reports is 6 out of 10. What will be seen is that typically
those municipalities who did not post Annual Reports, with the exception of the City of Brampton,
also did not post other important information as well and ended up with scores well below 5.
Therefore, not only is this double-accounting of Annual Reports somewhat appropriate given the
importance of the document, it does not appear to have unfairly penalized otherwise transparent
webpages. Being somewhat punitive in this evaluation is acceptable because when a municipality
views the publication of Integrity Commissioner content as an obligation to be dealt with
expediently it also has the potential to taint the spirit in which the services themselves are
approached by both council and the public.
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Limitations of the Research
The distribution of size of municipalities in Ontario given the population thresholds selected
led to a very small sample size that was dominated by only a few service providers. Of the sixteen
third-party Integrity Commissioners that were identified, only six different firms were listed. This
leads to results that are not likely to be statistically significant across all municipalities and
therefore the usefulness of detailed statistical analysis was severely limited. However, this is the
environment that exists under the current regime, and even this small sample size proved to be
illustrative.

Results: How transparent are Ontario’s Integrity Commissioners?
Following the review of the selected municipalities’ websites the scores were tabulated in
order to establish a relative ranking of each, compared to a maximum possible score of 10 points.
A summary of the total transparency scores received is shown in Table 2. The complete scoring
results are presented in Appendix A.
Table 2 - Results of Transparency Scoring

Municipality
City of Ottawa
Regional Municipality of
Durham
City of Windsor
City of Vaughan
Regional Municipality of
Niagara
City of Markham
City of Toronto
City of Mississauga
City of Brampton
City of Oshawa
Regional Municipality of
Waterloo

Tier
Single
Upper

Delivery Model
In-house
Third party

Transparency Score
10
9.64

Single
Lower
Upper

In-house
In-house
Third party

8.92
8.64
7.52

Lower
Single
Lower
Lower
Lower
Upper

Third party
In-house
Third party
In-house
Third party
Third party

6.92
6.92
6.56
5.64
5.36
5.28
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City of Burlington
City of Kitchener
Regional Municipality of
Simcoe
Regional Municipality of York
City of Greater Sudbury
City of London
City of Hamilton
Regional Municipality of Peel
Regional Municipality of Halton
City of Richmond Hill
Town of Oakville

Lower
Lower
Upper

Third party
Third party
Third party

4.88
4.88
4.88

Upper
Single
Single
Single
Upper
Upper
Lower
Lower

Third party
Third party
Third party
Third party
Third party
Third party
Third party
Third party

4.88
4.6
4.6
4.52
4.32
4.32
4.16
4.04

The scores show a wide variation in the assessed transparency of each municipality’s online
Integrity Commissioner content. The very high scores for Ottawa, Durham, Windsor and Vaughan
reflect webpages that contained a complete accounting of the activities of their respective Integrity
Commissioners, including annual reports for every year and investigation reports. The webpages
were for the most part easy to find, and the basic information regarding the role of Integrity
Commissioner and how the public can access it were clearly presented. At the other end of the
spectrum, while all of the municipalities reviewed had a webpage for their Integrity Commissioner,
many had little or no useful content, and even the identity of the Integrity Commissioner was
sometimes difficult to locate. The low scores achieved by a significant percentage of the
municipalities reviewed reflect that they may not even be meeting the most basic disclosure
expected of them.
In terms of more general observations, some of the key metrics from the scoring results are
summarized in Table 3. It can be seen that lower tier municipalities score consistently better, but
the average scores do not indicate a major variation between lower and upper tier municipalities
overall. This is not unexpected, since there are no inherent structural reasons that any form of
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municipality should be more predisposed to higher quality online presence than others in this
population range. Nevertheless, the consistently higher scores for lower tier municipalities does
perhaps warrant further investigation in future research.
Table 3 - Transparency Scores: General Observations

Number
In-House
IC Page Exists
IC Clearly Identified?
Annual Reports on website?
Complaint Process Clear?
Average Transparency Score

Lower Tier
15
5 (33%)
15 (100%)
14 (93%)
5 (33%)
15 (100%)
6.04

Upper Tier
7
0
7 (100%)
5 (71%)
2 (29%)
5 (71%)
5.83

Similarly, Figure 1 shows that within this range of populations the transparency scores
received did not display any discernible relationship to population. This provides some evidence

Figure 1 -Transparency Scores by Population

37

that the sample selection strategy was effective in controlling for the size of the municipality.
Given that neither the form nor the population of the municipality appears to influence the
transparency scores received in a significant way, the data seems to support the idea that either the
choices of the municipal council or the performance of the Integrity Commissioner are the more
direct influence.
In light of this observation, it may be more illuminating to compare the scores of
municipalities with in-house Integrity Commissioners with those obtained by municipalities
employing third parties for that role. Figure 2 is particularly useful in illustrating these differences.
Figure 2 - Transparency Scores by Integrity Commissioner Delivery Model

The graph of transparency scores in Figure 2 shows two clear groups of data. The first,
highest performers, seem to obtain scores of about 7 or higher. A large portion of the remainder
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appears to cluster just below a score of 5. It is possible that a score of 5 could represent an easily
obtained threshold below which a de minimis approach to transparency on the part of the
municipality can be inferred. Given that simply providing Annual Reports would have increased
those scores to closer to 6, it becomes apparent that if each municipality was mandated to produce
annual reports, the scoring system would need to be modified to provide greater resolution of
scores in order to better compare Integrity Commissioner content. As it stands, given the widely
varying transparency in the current environment, the scoring system developed, while coarse, is
nonetheless effective for identifying broader tendencies.
Of key interest for this comparison, the only municipality to receive a perfect transparency
score was the City of Ottawa. However, that score was based on the performance of a long-serving
and well-respected in-house Integrity Commissioner. The City has recently completed the
procurement of Integrity Commissioner services and has decided to employ a part-time, third party
firm for those services instead (Ottawa, 2021). Scoring the transparency of online content in the
first years of the new regime in that city could be an informative follow-up to this research.
Based on the preceding analysis of the results, certain key observations can be made about
the transparency of Integrity Commissioner webpages in the selected Ontario municipalities:


First, the scores vary widely, but there appear to be four clear leaders in transparency,
three are in-house Integrity Commissioners, and one is a third-party;



Only the top 8 municipalities obtained scores near 7 or above, while the majority appear
to settle around a score under 5. As discussed, this could establish a starting point for
identifying acceptable transparency that warrants further research;
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While in-house Integrity Commissioners seem more likely to have high transparency
scores, it is not guaranteed. Two of five municipalities with in-house Integrity
Commissioners have scores that are only slightly above-average;9



Care must be taken when drawing broad conclusions from such a small population. For
example, of the seventeen third party municipalities scored, twelve of them were served
by only two law firms. If those firms have set low information transparency standards,
it could artificially skew the overall results for third parties down.

Based on the scores obtained by the various municipalities it appears likely that, after
controlling for technical and fiscal capacity by eliminating smaller municipalities, the form of
municipality plays no significant role in determining how transparent their Integrity Commissioner
content is likely to be. Municipalities that employed in-house Integrity Commissioners appear far
more likely to obtain very high scores. Perhaps this is reflective of municipalities who value the
role more highly, but the sample size is too small allow transferable tendencies to be inferred. The
only conclusion that remains, then, is that the application of municipal Integrity Commissioners
across the province of Ontario is inconsistent and is likely subject more to the choices of councils
or their Integrity Commissioner and not due to any structural feature of the municipality. While
not statistically significant, this conclusion nonetheless proves informative when developing
strategies for overcoming the disparity of performances identified.

9

It is important to note that one in-house Integrity Commissioner (City of Toronto) had not published their 2020
annual report at the time of writing, which significantly lowered that overall score. However, the 2020 report would
have been the first report under a new Integrity Commissioner, so evaluating on the basis of the previous year’s
report would not have been representative. This is not completely unfair – timely disclosure is also an important part
of transparency.
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Section Four – What changes can ensure that municipal Integrity
Commissioners contribute to transparency in local government?
As described, there is very little consistency in the approach to the ways in which municipal
Integrity Commissioners in Ontario communicate their work to the public. AMCTO, in their 2017
submission to the Ontario Government, presciently noted:
It is unreasonable to forcefully expand the role of the integrity commissioner without
first setting out in legislation the basic principles for how that role should be practiced.
If the province does not set out such basic principles, the implementation of Bill 68’s
new powers for integrity commissioners will be characterized, not by enhanced
accountability, transparency or good governance, but by a patchwork of approaches
and inconsistently applied outcomes. (2017, p.10)
Given that the current state of communication of municipal Integrity Commissioners’
content has been shown to vary widely, from excellent to minimalist, it is apparent that leaving the
decision to local municipalities, acting alone or on the advice of their retained expert third parties,
does not result in a regime that adequately and reliably informs the public across the province.
This result supports the findings of Cucciniello and Nasi (2014) who illustrated how municipalities
in Italy tended towards providing just the minimum amount of information, rather than aspiring to
some higher ideal of disclosure.
The risk with the current state is that the public’s ability to trust the information it does
receive is reduced, which negatively impacts the ability of Integrity Commissioners to contribute
to accountability in local government and casts doubt on the primacy of the public awareness and
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electoral accountability at the polls expected by Sancton (2017) and Jepson (2018). The
“patchwork of approaches” AMCTO (2017) predicted has truly come to pass, and without any real
barriers that can be identified. Therefore, their demand for some type of standardization of the role
appears to be a suitable remedy. Since the focus of this paper is transparency, the location and
format of online Integrity Commissioner content is an obvious standardization to pursue.
Establishing a single system of standardized reporting will enhance the current contributions of
municipal Integrity Commissioners to local government. The scoring system developed for this
research in order to analyze the transparency of Integrity Commissioner web content provides a
useful framework for what that system can look like.

Standardized Webpage Content
As described, predictable access to trustworthy data is considered a hallmark of open and
transparent government (Gingras, 2012). In this digital age, the use of technology to provide a
reasonable web presence and communicate electronically is taken for granted (Stedman, 2018),
but even as early as 2001 the need for consistent format and navigation was identified (West,
2001). This research has demonstrated that, when it comes to the potential for municipal Integrity
Commissioner to contribute to transparency in local government through effective communication
to the public via their municipal websites, the strategies and results are widely variable.
Building from the scoring system that was developed, the key elements of an Integrity
Commissioner webpage that can contribute to transparency are related to how easy the webpage
is to find, and what content is available there. Accordingly, municipalities should be encouraged
to establish Integrity Commissioner webpages that:


Are hosted on the municipality’s website;
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Are available in a predictable location to simplify navigation (as a suggestion: under
“Council” and “Transparency” or “Accountability”);



Identify the Integrity Commissioner, with contact information;



Clearly describe the mandate of the Integrity Commissioner;



Contain single click links to the location where annual reports and investigation reports
are available for viewing and download;



Contain a link to the Council Code of Conduct;



Display, or contain a link to, a clear description of the complaints process.

As with all communication, the intended audience should always be considered (Cucciniello
and Nasi, 2014). Websites should be constructed not for the legal professionals who dominate the
field but for average citizens who may not necessarily understand what the role can do for them.
Therefore, extensive use of jargon and complex descriptions should be avoided whenever possible.

Standardized Reporting – Existence and Content
The research also demonstrated a lack of consistency with respect to what reporting, if any,
was available electronically. This is somewhat understandable, since the Municipal Act, 2001 is
quite vague in this regard and lacks any sort of mandated reporting. To improve transparency
requires only a simple mandate that each municipality must produce annual reports and separate
reports for each investigated complaint. Further, those reports should be available from the
municipality’s website. This would be a simple amendment to the Act, and some precedent can be
found in other jurisdictions for a top-down management of web content (Cucciniello and Nasi,
2014), although it does bring up some concerns about uneven impact to individual municipalities
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based on relative size that should be considered, especially since websites themselves are currently
not mandated for municipalities.
As for the content of the reports, the work of Veljkovic (2014) and others related to open
government regularly identifies the utility of the data as a key determinant of its openness. In
Stedman’s words, in order for the public to be able to contribute in an effective way to the work
of public ethics officers, “public disclosure statements must be searchable, sortable and
downloadable” (p. 93, 2018). This is taken to be especially applicable to annual reports, since they
would be a logical starting point for any citizen looking to learn more about the role, activities,
and which councillors may have been involved in any conflicts or code violations.
As a starting point, guidelines for annual report content and format could be produced by the
Ontario government, using the evaluation criteria employed in this study as a framework.
Accordingly, the annual reports should contain the following information at a minimum:


Activities over the reporting year to the highest level of specificity permitted by privacy
legislation;



Costs over the reporting year, broken down by task;



A comparison to prior years’ activities and costs, possibly over a five year period;

While a description of the mandate/role of the Integrity Commissioner is also considered to be of
value, its presence in the annual report is less important if that content is available on the webpage
as recommended.
Timing of all reports should also be standardized, with year-end defined within the
Municipal Act, 2001 and selected to avoid the moratorium on investigation and reporting in the
months leading up to an election (Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, s. 233.4 (7)-(9)).
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Of course, the development of guidelines does not necessarily address the patchwork
approach currently seen throughout Ontario, since discretion and optional participation are
inherent in such a strategy. In fact, research into standardized financial reporting in Ontario
demonstrated that a mandated system still produced inconsistent report quality (Schatteman,
2010). However, it is possible that the current inconsistency may still be due in part to the absence
of any kind of guidance at all on the subject. From this perspective, some form of standardization
is a reasonable first step to take as a means of building public engagement and trust in the
institution, even if that standardization is only intended to provide minimum expectations for
disclosure.

Standardized Reporting - Location
Finally, the transparency of the role from a provincial mandate perspective, not to mention
ease of access for an interested public, would benefit from a centralized repository of Integrity
Commissioner reports. This is supported by the literature (Lourenco, 2015). Some informal efforts
have already been made by certain Integrity Commissioners in Ontario to achieve this end. For
example, the Integrity Commissioner for the Region of Durham clearly demonstrated an
appreciation of the value of such a repository when he states in his 2020 annual report that:
…the reports of many municipal Integrity Commissioners, including me, appear on the
public, online, Canadian Legal Information Institute (CanLII) database, and are
accessible for free at https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onmic/. Outside Durham Region,
some municipalities and some Integrity Commissioners do not participate in CanLII,
or post their reports. In my opinion, this is unfortunate; to make the results of an
accountability exercise difficult to find is to defeat the purpose. (Giorno, 2020: p.4)
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However, the CanLII website is intended primarily for legal professionals and is difficult for
the average member of the public to navigate. There also appears to be limited ability to search by
municipality. Instead, the Ontario Ombudsman appears to be a logical location for this
information, especially since that office is also already associated with public complaints,
maintaining a consistency of message. However, it would need to be clearly noted that those
reports are not by the Ombudsman in order to maintain the benefits of locally effected
accountability. The goal of hosting this repository with the Ombudsman would not be one of
oversight, but rather of simplifying both the ability of the public to obtain information (either about
their municipality or a specific councillor who may have come from another municipality) and for
all municipalities (especially smaller ones) to reference these reports. Rather than needing to
format and host this content, simple links can be provided and the search functions would be
created and facilitated by the Ombudsman while the pertinent metadata (essential for effective
searching) is input by the respective Integrity Commissioner in completing and submitting their
reports. 10 This also retains an element of autonomy for the province’s municipalities while
ensuring a consistent level of accountability, which is a difficult balance to achieve.

Municipal Equity Considerations
An obvious challenge for any province in establishing the terms for empowering
municipalities in any role is the diversity of needs. In Ontario, 444 distinct municipalities, some
rural, some urban, with populations varying from zero to almost 3 million are enabled by a single
statute (Municipal Act, 2001). Clearly this diversity of needs and the associated benefits of local

10

Other bodies in Ontario already operate in such a way. For example, the Ontario Information and Privacy
Commissioner: https://www.ipc.on.ca
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control and design of service delivery can be an argument in favour of enhanced autonomy for
what many feel are already established and mature levels of government (Sancton, 2015). For the
purposes of this paper, however, this diversity simply highlights that one-size-fits-all approaches
to provincially mandated accountability officers may not deliver consistent value propositions for
each municipality. For example, costs associated with singular deliverable metrics can be expected
to impact smaller municipalities disproportionately (AMCTO, 2015). However, the proposal for
standardized Integrity Commissioner reporting can also provide benefits for both small and large
municipalities.
AMCTO raised concerns in their response to Bill 68 about the potential for mandatory
reporting measures to unduly impact the operating budgets of smaller municipalities (2017). While
this was not researched, it is considered to be a reasonable expectation. Smaller municipalities
simply do not have the tax bases or staff levels to be able to seamlessly integrate enhanced
reporting requirements (AMCTO, 2015). However, there are certain elements of standardization
that can help mitigate the impact to these smaller centres.
A randomized review of certain smaller municipalities was undertaken that identified an
interesting trend: amongst smaller municipalities (none of whom had in-house integrity
commissioners, as would be expected), those that had any reasonable public accounting of the role
of Integrity Commissioner were the municipalities that had enhanced their procurement and
funding capacity by partnering with either neighbouring municipalities of similar size, or with their
associated upper tier municipality. In those cases, a single Integrity Commissioner provided
services to all member municipalities, sometimes producing a single annual report that can easily
be referenced by each member, and the costs of which would be shared. This seems to be a viable
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model for ensuring quality delivery of service and public availability of Integrity Commissioner
content without unfairly impacting the budgets of smaller municipalities.
In addition to economies of scale, establishing stricter guidelines surrounding the form and
content of Integrity Commissioner deliverables could actually introduce some cost certainty into
the procurement process. Effectively, the base amounts of any assignment become very well
defined, including annual reports and council education sessions. This then allows for the
development of defined and competitive retainers and permits municipalities to assign whatever
value they deem appropriate to hourly rates and other factors listed in Integrity Commissioner
proposals. The relative benefits of various procurement strategies would be a worthwhile area of
investigation for future research, not only for Integrity Commissioners but for other mandated
municipal roles that may not be practical for smaller municipalities to implement individually.
The assumption that large municipalities have greater means and access to expertise to create
and maintain web content is integral to this research. On that basis, the burden of provincially
mandated transparency for Integrity Commissioners is expected to be negligible in relation to the
resources available to these larger centres. The benefits for Ontario’s larger municipalities are
better assessed in terms of the more theoretical aspects discussed in this paper, those being
enhanced visibility of the role with the potential to contribute to public engagement and political
accountability for elected officials. However, larger municipalities would still also benefit from
increased procurement clarity, should they choose to pursue a third-party for Integrity
Commissioner services.
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Consideration of a Standards Body for Integrity Commissioners
While there is no formal body responsible for standards or advocacy on the part of Integrity
Commissioners, the 2019 annual report of the City of Toronto Integrity Commissioner makes
reference to the Municipal Integrity Commissioners of Ontario: “The Commissioner attended two
meetings of the Municipal Integrity Commissioners of Ontario ("MICO"), which is a gathering of
integrity commissioners from municipalities across the province. This growing, informal group of
practitioners in the field of municipal ethics and integrity is an invaluable resource to the Office
and will play a key role in developing a core set of best practices for municipal integrity
commissioners in Canada” (Toronto, 2019: p. 40). As an alternative to amending the Municipal
Act to enforce standardization of Integrity Commissioner practices, this informal group could be
formalized as a non-legislated means to achieve the same end. A body that brings practitioners
together could provide an appropriate forum within which to establish accepted standards of
practice while also providing a convenient location for the centralized repository for Integrity
Commissioner reports proposed previously.

Conclusion
In the end, the question really does come down to this: who’s watching, and does anybody
know? Because municipalities remain creatures of the province, oversight of municipalities still
rests with the government of Ontario. The Province has mandated that all municipalities, at their
own cost, hire Integrity Commissioners to be available as a resource to municipal councillors and
ultimately to provide some accountability of those elected officials, delegating a part of the
oversight mandate to local governments. Arguments have been made that some of what the
Province tried to do in enhancing municipal Integrity Commissioners in Ontario were “solutions
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in search of a problem” (p.4, AMCTO, 2017), but the fact remains that the values that Integrity
Commissioners uphold are still things that each individual municipality has determined to be
important in their local government, and the inconsistency of approach to public information has
rendered Integrity Commissioners a solution with missed opportunity.
Enhanced transparency can make significant contributions to the accountability and
effectiveness of local government, and the literature suggests that those contributions can be
expected to be universally beneficial. Unfortunately, the wide variability in the quality and
accessibility of Integrity Commissioner documentation across the twenty-two municipalities
reviewed demonstrates that consistent transparency is not being achieved under the current
framework. Perhaps a tighter definition and regulation of the role and its products is therefore
justified.
Implementing more strictly defined regulatory requirements is a fine line to walk for the
Province. While the theoretical goals of increased transparency and the resultant accountability
may justify the action, incorporating more prescriptive measures into the Municipal Act, 2001 has
the potential to infringe on municipal autonomy by limiting a council’s ability to pick and pay for
the services they choose. Imposing stringent reporting requirements also has the potential to
increase base costs for the service that could negatively impact smaller municipalities. On the other
hand, this research has shown a propensity for municipalities employing third-party Integrity
Commissioners to fall short with respect to transparency goals, regardless of population.11 The

11

Noting that there are obviously exceptions. Third-party Integrity Commissioner Guy Giorno has facilitated an
excellent online presence for the Regional Municipality of Durham. Oddly, the City of Oshawa partners with
Durham for Integrity Commissioner services, but their online presence is much less transparent.
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example of the City of Ottawa provides an ideal opportunity to test this theory. Time will tell if
the trend identified in this research for reduced transparency in third party Integrity Commissioners
is borne out, but what is clear is that without defined quality guidelines the result remains very
much in doubt.
There is also an additional academic and public service benefit of defined minimum
reporting requirements. By minimizing variation across municipalities in terms of what documents
are published, an in-depth review of the actual content becomes more informative. It is not difficult
to see that, as a next phase of academic exploration, such a content-focused analysis would speak
much more directly to the benefits of transparent government espoused by the literature, bringing
the study closer to analyzing the impacts of Integrity Commissioners’ work on the communities
they serve.
As Sancton (2017) and Jepson (2018) observe, political accountability remains the ultimate
tool that the public has at its disposal in order to ensure that citizens get the representation that
they want in local government. Transparency of government has been shown to increase trust and
engagement, applied in both the federal and local government contexts (Kassen, 2013). As this
research has demonstrated, the role that Integrity Commissioners in Ontario’s largest
municipalities play in contributing to transparency of government is inconsistent, and at times
ineffective.
While enhanced municipal autonomy remains a worthy goal, the availability of discretion
on the part of municipalities in how the work of their Integrity Commissioners is communicated
has resulted in an overall poor embodiment of transparent government and therefore misses out on
a significant opportunity for the role to contribute to the public discourse (Gingras, 2012). The
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implementation of some of the recommendations presented in this paper is expected to enhance
the consistent transparency of the role of municipal Integrity Commissioners in Ontario, increasing
its ability to contribute to their communities by reliably and effectively communicating their work
to the voting public. Without transparency, these mandated accountability officers will continue
watching but remain unseen.
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Appendix A – Transparency Scoring Sheet: Full Results

Transparency Scoring Sheet - Selected Ontario Municipalities

Accessibility

Municipality

IC Model

Single/Lower Tier
Toronto
in house
Ottawa
in house
Mississauga
third party
Brampton
in house
Hamilton
third party
London
third party
Markham
third party
Vaughan
in house
Kitchener
third party
Windsor
in house
Richmond Hill
third party
Oakville
third party
Burlington
third party
Greater Sudbury third party
Oshawa
third party
Upper Tier
Peel
Third Party
York
Third Party
Durham
Third Party
Halton
Third Party
Waterloo
Third Party
Niagara
Third Party
Simcoe
Third Party

Weight
20%

Basic Information

Weight
16%

Data Utility

Is there
an IC
page?

Score
(5)

# of
Clicks to
find IC
page

Score
(5)

Failed
Searches

Score
(deduct)

Total

Category
Score

Identify
IC?

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
5

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
0
5
5
0
5
5
5
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
5
10
10
5
10
10
10
5

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
1

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Form
Yes
Yes
Yes

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
1
4
4
4

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Partial

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
1

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
7
10
10
7

1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.12
1.6
1.6
1.12

Clear
Clear
Clear
Clear
Clear
Clear
Clear
Clear
Clear
Clear
Clear
Clear
Clear
Clear
Clear

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

5
5
5
5
5
5
5

2
2
3
3
3
3
3

5
5
5
5
5
5
5

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

10
10
10
10
10
10
10

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

1
4
4
4
0
0
4

Vague
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

1
4
4
4
4
4
4

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

4
10
10
10
6
6
10

0.8
2
2
2
1.2
1.2
2

Vague
Clear
Clear
None
Clear
Clear
Clear

Score Description of Score
(4) Role/ Mandate (4)

Link to
Code of
Conduct

Category
Score
Total
Score
(2)

Weight
28%

Annual
Reports
Published?

Score
(4)

Investigation
Reports?

2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2

Partial
Yes
Partial
No
No
No
Partial
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Partial

2
4
2
0
0
0
2
4
0
4
0
0
0
0
2

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes

4
4
4
4
0
0
4
4
0
4
1
0
0
0
5

1
2
2
0
2
2
2

No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No

0
0
4
0
0
2
0

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No

5
0
4
0
5
2
0

Description of Score
Process
(2)

Data Quality
Quality of Annual Report

Weight
36%

Category
Score

Clarity of
basic
information

Score
(2)

List
Activities
(4)

Previous
Activities
(1)

Budget
(2)

Describe
Role (1)

Total

Category
Score

Transparency
Score (10)

8
10
8
6
2
1
8
10
2
10
3
2
2
1
9

2.24
2.8
2.24
1.68
0.56
0.28
2.24
2.8
0.56
2.8
0.84
0.56
0.56
0.28
2.52

Good
Good
Good
Fair
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good
Fair
Good
Fair
Good
Good
Good

2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
2

0
4
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
4
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

3
10
2
1
1
2
3
9
2
7
2
1
2
2
2

1.08
3.6
0.72
0.36
0.36
0.72
1.08
3.24
0.72
2.52
0.72
0.36
0.72
0.72
0.72

6.92
10
6.56
5.64
4.52
4.6
6.92
8.64
4.88
8.92
4.16
4.04
4.88
4.6
5.36

6
2
10
0
7
6
2

1.2
0.4
2
0
1.4
1.2
0.4

Poor
Good
Good
Good
Fair
Fair
Good

0
2
2
2
1
1
2

0
0
3
0
0
3
0

0
0
1
0
0
1
0

0
0
2
0
0
2
0

0
0
1
0
0
1
0

0
2
9
2
1
8
2

0
0.4
1.8
0.4
0.2
1.6
0.4

4
4.8
7.8
4.4
4.8
6
4.8

Score
Total
(4)

